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MARVIN tJ. HODGSON 439 
(33 Co2\! 439: 202 P.2\! 1) 
fL. A. No. 20685. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1949.) 
JACK MAUVIN et aI., Rt.:spondcnts, v. WILLIAM E. 
HODGSON, Appellant. 
'[1] L:lbor-Labor Laws-Fair Labor St:/.ndards Act.-Under tht' 
Pair 4'\bor Standards Act (52 Stats. 1060; 29 U.S.C.A. 
11201-209), v.ithout securing the approval of the National 
War Labor Board, an employer engaged in interstate com-
Mt..'l'Ce may Rg'rce with his employees on a new and lower bllSie 
rate of hourly pay for the first 40 hours of each workweek 
thun thnt pr~viously paid, to be augmcnted for overtime as 
provided, 110 10Dg as that rate is not less than the minimum 
W8gC fixed by lllW, whtlre the purpose is net to ehange the total 
wage but to comply with the act. Neither the Wage Stnbilizn-
tion Ad of 1942 (56 Stats. 765; 50 U.S.C.A. App. §S 961-971) 
DOr the ord"n prolllulll:atcd thereunder are intended to ajJ:tlCt 
the operlttion of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
~. '"'t 
;: ·APPEAL frOIn a judgment of the Superior Court of Lo:l 
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Reversed. 
J~; Action to rllCOVt."1' overtime W3gCS, JiquiJllfl'd d:ua"l-,YcS and 
(,,~rncy's ft..~ .• JuJ~lJ1Cllt for plaintitIs rcvur&lCd. 
~~ . 
. ;.t~erbert R. Lande for 4ppellant. 
-' ,-;~, . i*lrPaul Madsen for R~ondunta. 
~~SOHAUER, J.-Defend~t appeals from a judgment in 
}A'ior of plaintiffs, hiN former employc.c;, for Ct~rt<lin 1'1l11lJ; a.-; 
,dditional wn~efl, plus liqnidatcd dllmalCes Ilnd nttorm'Y'R 
'A.>etc~ to which plaintiffs cll,im to hI' f>ntitlcd nndf>r the? pro-
::tf!dOD51 of "cctions 7 and 16 t)f the Fair Labor StandRrd~ At't 
:.ofj 1938 (52 Stat.c;. 1060; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219). Drfcnd:mt 
:c\bntends that he has paid plaintiffs all of the wage. .. to which 
~ey are entitled under their contract wit.h him and undl,r 
',applicable law and that, in any event, liquidated damllg~s 
:ihonld Dot have been awarded. We have concluded that de-
-;r"ndant's first contention must be sustained, that accordin~]y 
j)]~Dtif"[S h!lve no ri~ht to further payments from defendant 
~d that the jud~ent must be reversed. 
~A-'Y 
J(1] See 1 Oal.Jur.l0-Yr. Supp. (1945 Rev.) 465; 31 Am.Jur. 
- OIi:t . 
)i!cK. Dis. '&oCeronco: [1] Labor, § 1.1. 
) 
.. ) 
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Defendant "'as in the business- of supplying guards to 
certain of tbt' ships of the War Shipping Administration dur-
ing such times as they were in port at Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. It is for work performed for defendant during t.he 
period of July 16, 1944, to October 31, 1945, in performance 
of his contract with the War Shipping Administration, thr.t 
plaintiffs claim tliey were underpaid. Prior to July 16, 1944, 
defendant paid the guards, among whom were plaintiffs, :!t 
the rate of 92% cents an hour for all hours worked. The 
Utlual workweek was 84 hours, divided into seven days of 
twelve hours each. Defendant, prior to the mentioned date 
. (July 16,1944), apparently believing tbat he was not required 
to do otherwise, paid no overtime rate for hours worked over 
40 a week. Likewise, the War Shipping Administration dur-
ing the times here involved paid defendant a l1at rate of $1.05 
an hour for each guard furnished, regardlcs.o; of the number 
of hours a week worked by each lUan; i. c., no overtime rate 
was paid by the government 8.l.!'ency to defendant at any time. 
If defendant bad paid plaintiffs time and one-half on 92% 
cents an hour for hours worked over 40 " week, he would 
bl\ve p:lid $1.3875 an hour for approximately 44 houl'!; per 
man per week for work for which he received from the Wa.r 
Shipping Administration only $1.05 Ull hour; stated anot.her 
way, defendant would bave paid eacb plaintiU II. toull of 
$98.05 fur tit,. 1I:o;unl 84-hour workw('l.'k, although (k!clldant 
recoived only $88.20 pl~r mlUl from th~ War Shipping Ad-
ministration for ~llch workweek. It was, of conrsc, bnyond 
the power of defendant to hhn.~olf change the nmount pnid 
him by the government agency. Shortly prior to July 15, 
1944, . defendant was informed by a representlltive of t.he 
Wage and Hour Division df the United States Department of 
Labor that th~t agency had reached the view that defendant 
"was engaged in interstate commerce, and was bound by 
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to pay his 
employel)S one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for 
all honrs worked in excess of forty per week." He was ad-
vised by letter, aceordin~ to defendant's testimony, that "they 
figllrl!d, ingoiD~ over the accounts of the claims that had b('cn 
made, that lowed clol'lP. to ~3,OOO overtime, but inn.~mneh as 
I had betm able to collect only $1.05, that I was being exon-
-During the }IOriod prior to JulT 15, 1944, dcfendmlt's buswcSII WILlI 
meorpnrstro: st~rting ontbl\t dnte he opel'l1ted as an illdividu:11. How-
ever, ill ornl nrl:llmcnt bctorll thiB cuurt hc eonccdc(l that for tllc purposC8 
of thh. "aSI! ...... hould be treated .. havinlr done busin811 .. aD individual 





,I. Ftb.1949] MARVIN 11. HODOSON 441 e [33 C.2d 439; 202 P.2d 11 
~', 
, erated from having to pay that ... They told me they gave 
~: until July 15th to make arrangements wht'rl.'hy I could pay 
overtime . . . He said that the current rate would have to 
be set, whereby I would pay overtime, if I wished to stay in 
business ... They told me I would have to change; ... that 
. I would have to pay time and a half for overtime, even if it 
mc,tJnf lowering m.y ba.~ic rate. That is where I got the idea in 
the first place to stay in business." (Italics added.) Defendant 
&1Ao testified that "As I was only able to collect $1.05, I had 
, ~Jl exonerated from paying any penalty" for failure to 
Pal time and a half on 92112 cents an hour prior to July 16, 
1944. He testified further that it was necessary that the 
inex.' work 12 hours a day, seven days a week, because of the 
portage of labor and the necessity of covering all the ships 
m. Port, and that "If we could have given them a day off, 
could have paid a higher rate of wage." Defendant does 
dispute the labor department's ruling that subsequent 
16, 1944, he was bound by law to pay one and one-half 
if,~~'''''' the ba.'!ic rate for overtime. 
critical question is whether the applicable laws and 
could btl complied with (at least, without the 
I!' ·",nnl~nv:A.1 of the War Labor Board) only by increasing the 
wage paid for the established workweek or whether they 
complied with by the voluntary agreement of defendant 
plnintiffs providing for continulUlce of suhRtantiaUy t.he 
, .. total waae for the fulJ workweek but computed and 
..... "' .... ~~.--' on the hn.~iR of 'leAS lUoney for the first 40 hours 
'''time and onr.-ha}f" for the additional 44 hour.t. 
:Becltton 7 or the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.A. 
) provides, so far as here material, that an employer in 
iiferstate commerCl~ shall not "employ any of his employees 
a workweek lon~er than forty hours • • . unless 
ueJl'e:mt)lo~vee receives compensation for hi'! employment in 
the hour.t above specified at a rate not leRS than one 
:o:oe-half times the regular rafe at which he is employed." 
.... 'r~_" added.) Subdivision (b) of section 16 of the act 
'U.S~C.A. § 216) states: "Any employer who violates the 
~"9i+n"r;lIil\nll of section . . . 7 . . . shall be liable to the em· 
o:t' employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 
ltiD:iJDliu' n' wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as 
may be, and in an additional equal amount as 
lunl(lBT~(l damages. Action to recover such liability may be 
in any court of COlllpp.t(>nt jurisdiction ... The 
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awnrded to the plaintiff or plnintiff~, allow 1\ reasonable 
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the 
action. " 
Confronted with the alternative of going out of business 
at a time when the services being rendered were sorely needed 
(the work was classified as "essential" in the wur effort) or 
else of lowering the hourly rate of pay for the first 40 hours 
in order to pay the required overtime rate for hours worked 
over 40 a week, defendant, with the assistance and advice of 
plaintiff Marvin, called a meeting of all the guards, for July 
14, 1945. Plaintiff Marvin testified that he and defendant's 
other employes previously "had been subpoenaed before the 
Wage and Hour Department" and knew of the "difficulty over 
the payment of .ovcrtime." At the meeting defendant ex-
plained his contract with the War Shipping Administration 
and proposed to the guards, including plninti1fs, thnt he 
thereafter pay them at the rate of 70 cents an hour for the 
first 40 hours of each worlnveek, $1.05 an hour for aU addi-
tional honrs worked the first sL,,( days of each worl;:wCt~k, and 
$1.40 an hour for hours worked on the seventh day. The 
tot.al pay of each man for the 84-hour workweek (which was 
to be continued) would thus remain approximately the same 
as prior to the proposed change in hourly rate. In other 
woru:s, t.he propO&'11 was neither to increase nor to decre:u;e the 
total W&gt'S actually paid, but merely to adjust the method 
or b:tsis of computing snch wages in order to comply with th" 
Jaw. Defendant specifically told the men that he was receiv· 
i~ only $1.05 RIl hour from the War Shipping Administra-
tion, that. he had to meet various expenses (which he itemized, 
including charges for workmen's compensation, social security 
and unemployment insurance) of the business, that until and 
unlt-s.c; he could gc..>tmort' from th .. War Shipping Administra-
tion he could pay them no more than the rateR stated, and 
thnt "they could either accept it or reject it." Three or four 
of the guards did not accept the proposal and left defendant's 
employ, but the others, including plaintiffs, remained on the 
job and thereafter continued to be paid their wages in sub-
stantially the same amounts as before but computed on the new 
basis. 
Plaintiff Marvin testified that he continued working, and 
"well unden.-tood" the new wage rates. Others of the guards 
testified that when. the new rates wcre offered plaintiff Marvin 
"made a tall. to the boys and he told them for the presl'nt 
we should accept it, We should accept the term.", but that 
) 
) 
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we totlrc going nfter the War .t;;(hi1"Pinfl t1dm;lIl.~tratif)f&, that 
tbey were doing the bl'st they coulcl, thf'y wprl' tryjn~ thdr 
very best to fret us more money and would eV(,lltllally get 1111 
more money I\nd pOR!\ibly our back pay from them"; that 
"Mr. Hodgson didn't have the money, he never received it, w, 
""r, going after the Shipping Administration, not Mr. Hodg-
,Qf&. 1 kne11J that Mr. Hodgson did not owe me anything"; 
, that "Mr. Hodgson was tighting all the time to flet us as 
i~:,' much money as he possibiy could. " (I talies added.) Defendnnt , &1so testified that he persistently attempted, althoul!'h with-
,: out success, to secure an increased rate from the War Ship-
t' ping Administration in order to pay his employes the highe~t 
~, possible wage; that if his, employes could earn higher pay 
" elsewhere he freely gave to them the "a\,ailability slips" that 
.' .ere at that time required for tran.c;fering from a "frozen" 
, ' ~r essential war job such a.~ the tnlard work here was cla&:'liticd, 
~io other work. 
'> Plaintiffs continued in defendant's employ until October 
." 81; 1945, and received their pay under the new schedule. r On November 6, 1945, they tiled this action. They ure-a that f J>eeall.'le defendant did not secu;e t~e approval of thc National 
" War Labor Board before puttmg mto effect the new hourly 
, wage-computation schedule to which they had agreed, that 
\ they, were and are entitlad to be paid for the period between 
:', .r~ly 16, 1945, and October 31, 1945, at the old rate of 92% 
"~nts an hour for the tirst 40 hours worked each week, plus 
folie and one-half times that rate for all hours in excess of 40 
;;~ach week; in other words, plainti1fs argue that their "rej!ular 
:'fate" of pay, as those "",ords are used in section 7 of the Fair 
(X\abor Standards Act, quoted hereinabove, remained at 92% 
;,~nts an hour, and that the effect of the time and one-half 
:' FOvision for overtime was to give them an increase in total 
:~ w.,~ over the! amounts previously paid. They I\.<;:«:rt t.h:Lt "i( a m,'1ttcr of law they arc entitled to receive the! int'l"east: 
f despite thcir clear understanding of tht: new wage COtnput."l-
r tion schedule and of the reason and necessity therefor, and 
~,dc.qpite the fact that they accepted the new schedule in.'lof!U' 
~ lis' defendant's obligation was concerned and continued work-I ~ at the changed hourly rateR. The trial court held with 
:PJ,aintiff." judgment WitS entered accordingly, including liqui. 
',4&~d dam&ll'CS and IlttorneY'II fees, and defendant appealed. 
l~t.As previonsly indiclLted we think t.hat determination of the 
~:ciLc;i hint!CS on whtofhrr, nudc'r "D the circum~tancc:R, the 
1l>p1icahle Ia ... owl ...,,,,,latioDa could be compUed .itb (ia 
) 
) 
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tbl' abs~nce of approval by tbf> War Labor Board) only by 
continuing the old ba.'1ic rate for the first 40 hours of eacb 
workwl'ck and incrcllsing the rate to "time and one-half" for 
honrs ovcr 40, or whethcr the parties could lawfully agree 
on a new schedule of hourly rates which :;;reserved sub-
stantially the same total wap.'e for the full workweek but which, 
hy reducing the hourly rate for the first 40 hours and increas-
ina the rnte for hours over 40, complied with the requirement 
for "time and cne-half" for the hours over 40. To express 
it another way. did the applicable provisions of the Jaw and 
t!xecntive rl:gulations, under the circumstances shown, operate 
by themselves necessarily to increase the total wage for the 
full workweek or was the agreement of the parties for adjust-
ment of the hourly rates to comply with the required over-
time rates but continue substantially the same total wage for 
thl! full workweek lawful' We conclude that under the 
circum~tnnces shown the agreement is not void and that the 
hiahl'r toto'll walle was not imposed by law. 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act "as a matter of law employer 
and l'lJ1ployec DUly establish the 'regular rate' by contract." 
(WalU-ng v. A. H. Belo Oorp. (1942), 316 U.S. 624, 631 [62 
S.Ct. 1223, 1227, 86 L.Ed. 1716].) In the Belo ca.o;e, where 
"the purpose of respondent's arral1gem~nt with its employees 
W:\ll to permit as far as possible the payment of the same 
tot~l weekly waao after the Act as before" by agreeing with 
tbe l~lllployees upon a new and lower "regular rate" of 
hourly pay, thnt court further established that "nothing in the 
Al,t bllJ'S an l'mployer from contracting with his employecs 
to pay them thc same wagej; that tht>y received previously, 
so loJU! 8.'1 thll new rnte equals or cxcecd.'1 the minimum [40 
cl'nil; nD. hour, § 206 (a) of the act1 required by the Act." 
(316 U.S. at pngll 630~) Other cases following the Belo 
holding are Atlantic Co. v. Walling (1942),5 C.C.A., 131 F.2d 
518, 521; White v. Witwer Grocer Cn. (1942), 8 C.C.A., 132 
F.2d 108, 111; General Mills,lnc. v. Williams (1942),6 C.C.A., 
132 F.2d 367, 370; Shepler v. Orucible Fuel Co. (1944), 
3 C.C.A., 140 F.2d 371, 373; Bergsr.hneidcr v. Peabody Coal 
Co. (1944),7 C.C.A., 142 F.2d 784, 786; see, also, Murray v. 
Noblesville Milling 00. (1942), 7 C.C.A., 131 F.2d 470, 474, 
cert. den. 318 U.S. 775 [6::1 8.Ct. 832, 87 L.Ed. 11451. In 
the Whitc and the General Mills cn.~cs agreements betwecn 
employer and employe for a "reduced ba.c;ic hourly rate" 
under which, with time and one-hnlf for over 40 hours each 
) 
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week, the weekly pay remained thc same &; prior to tht> di'l'c-
tive date of the Fair Labor Standnrd~ Act, were upheld as 
valid under the act. 
, [1] It is thus apparent that dcfendant's new ",au-('-
computation schedule violated no specific provision of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act and is fairly within the "opera-
'tion of the act." Plaintiffs contund, however, that thu ncw 
schedule resulted in "1\ reduction in the ratc" of plaintiffs' 
and that, therefore, under c~rtain provil;ioD!1 of the 
Act of 1942 (56 Stilts. 765; 50 U.S.C.A. App. 
961-971), and the rules and regulations promllhrated there-
(see, also, section 7 of the War Labor Disputes Act 
(1943), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1507), defcndnnt was required 
, secure the approval of the National W nr L!\bor Board 
he could lawfully put the new computation :;chcdule 
effect. Plaintiffs rely particularly upon the provisions 
subdivision (a) of section 5 of the Stnbilizntion Act of 
to the effect that "No cmployer shall pny, and no 
'employee shall receive, WBg(.'S or Gularics in contrnvcntion of 
, regulations promulgated by the Prc.o;;ident undcr this Act," 
well as upon the provision of section 1 of title II of 
F.:Eixec:uti've Order No. 9250 (50 U.S.C.A. App., p. 315), io;.c;llrd 
l'inil1smmt to authority grantcd by section 2 of thc Stabilization 
of 1942, that "1. No incrcases in wage rates ... and 
decreases in wage rates, I'lhall be nnthorizod unless notice 
such increases or decreases shall have been filed with 
National War Labor Board, and unlcs.~ the National War 
!mabc:lr Board has approved such increases or dccren.c;es." 
~"'!I'tIA history of the National War Labor Board and the 
l1IiBt11re and cffect of its orders were revic\\'cd by this court in 
lmI!'ilii,.RMl Candy Co. v. Waits (1946), 27 Ca1.2d 615, 617-619 
P.2d 674], and neeJ lJot be repented herl'. It is sufficient 
out that we therc held, in reliance upon federal <It'd-
by which we are bound, that (pp. 618-619) "the board's 
Rtdlmf".' .. rest simply on an appeal to the moral obligation 
parties and are neither enforceable nor reviewable 
the courts]. [Citations.] ... 'Th~ National War Labor 
IIH08.!'d· is not, under the law, vested with judicial functions, 
it have power to enforce its determinations, called 
_ml~e(l:tivIPJl " upon the parties to a controversy before it . . .' 
Workers Inter. Union v. Tezoma Nat. Gas Co., 146 F.2d 
)" (See also Martin v. Campanaro (1946), 2 C.C.A., 
.F.2d 127, 129.) Moreover, we there noted that it is 
. in Baltimore Transit Co. v. lo'lYllll (1913),50 It'.Supp. 
) 
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382,387, that the board "does not exist as a tribunal to deter-
mine the legal rights and obligations of employer and em-
ployee, or to protect and· enforce such rights, but merely to 
decide how such rights, in the Board's opinion, are to be 
exercised in. the public interest in view of the state of war." 
It would thus appear that even if ·defendant here had sought 
approval b,. the National War Labor Board o,f the new wage 
schedule, he would have been legally free, insofar, at least, 
88 any authority of the National War Labor Board itself is 
concerned, to disregard an,. approval or disapproval which 
the board might have expressed and to adopt or not adopt 
the new schedule according 88 he and his employes might 
agree. Defendant urges that therefore his failure to seek 
approval of the board cannot have the binding e1fect of freez-
ing his "regular rate" under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
at 92th cents an hour and thereby creating the liability sought 
to be enforced in this action. Defendant's position in this 
respect appears to be sound in the light of the applicable 
court decisions. 
The question remains as to whether the asserted liability 
springs from the Stabilization Act of 1942 and the executive 
order hereinabove mentioned. It is to be noted at the outset 
that the purpose of the Stabilization Act is disclosed in section 
967 (50 U.S.C.A_> 88 follows: "In order to aid in the e1fective 
prosecution of the war, the President is authorized ••. to 
issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages, and. salaries, 
a1fecting the cost of living; and, except as otherwise provided 
in this Act, such stabilization shall so far as practicable be 
on the basis of the levels which existed on September 15, 1942. 
[Itlioes not" clearli-apl>~&r·from the record before us whether 
the defendant was in business on or prior to September 15, 
1942, but it St.'eWS to 00 assumed by the parties that they were 
subjc(..-t to the Stabilization Act and thc executive orders issued 
thereunder insofar 88 they may be applieable.]The President 
may, except as otherwise provided in this Act, thereafter 
[subsequent to November I, 1942] provide for making adjust-
ments with respect to prices, wages, and salaries, to the extent 
that he finds necessary to aid in the e1fective prosecution of 
the war or to correct gross inequities." Furthermore, it is 
to be noted that title II of Executive Order No. 9250 (upon 
section 1 of which plainti1fs rely) provides (in section 2) that 
"The National War Labor Board shall not approve any 
inCl'ease in the wage rates prevailing on September 15, 1942, 
unless such increase is necessary to correct maladjustments 
, Feb.1949] MARVIN v. HODGSON 
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ill'" in('f~lIalitil'S. to ... 1iminatc· slIhl'oltanchu'fls flf li\"illg, 'n (,lIrr('c·t 
JtrOS!i itWIJIl ities. Ill' to <I iet iu till' ('ITf'\" i \"I' I'I'osP('ntion of • hI' 
war ... [In scction 3.] The National War Labor Board 
: shall not approve a decrease in the wages for any particular 
,,,,ork [italics added] below the highest wages paid therefor 
6etWeen January 1, 1942, and September 15, 1942, unle::;s to 
" ' gross inequities and to aid in the effective prosecution 
war. [In section 4.] The National War Labor Board 
by general regulation, make such exemptions from the 
tm)WIIOIIS of this title in the case of small total wage increases 
deems necessary for the effective administration of this 
... [Title VI, § 1.] Nothing in this Order shall be 
.~!OJ;ll!Jtr1Iled. as affecting the present operation of the Fair Labor 
Act. " (Italics added.) Also, Executive Order 
by which the National War Labor Board was created 
I£wii'i,,"', to congressional authority therefor (see Pearson Candy 
Waits (1946), supra, 27 Cal.2d 615, 617), specifies in 
1; .• !Ctlc~n 7 (50 U.S.C.A. App., p. 583) that "Nothing herein 
be construed as superseding or in conflict with the provi-
of ... the Fair Labor Standards Act ... " And it is 
W'i)ro,ridE!d in section 4 of the Stabilization Act of 1942, as 
l:>ameJIlQE!Q in 1943 and 1944, that "No action shall be taken 
authority of this Act with respect to wages or s:llnrics, 
'which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Fair 
.. Standards Act of 1938, as amended ... " (50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 964.) From the foregoing quotations it becomes appal'-
the purpose of the Stabilization Act and of the 
orders thereunder was to stabilize wages, not to 
mc:rcslScs or decreases, and not to affect in any way "the 
operation of the'Fair Labor Standards Act." 
not been shown to us whether the National War 
Board, in conformity with the directive set forth in 
, quoted section 4 of title II of Executive Order No. 
"by general regulation" made such an exemption "in 
- of small total wage increases" as would fit this case. 
wage-computation schedule agreed upon as of July 
while amounting substantially to a continuation of 
"total wage" as to each of defendant's employes 
increased his "total wage" approximately 10 cents 
,It does appear to us, however, that such increase of 
a day was negligible (no claim is made that the agoree-
. was void because of sllch lncrea.'!(') and that the readjust-
~f.the wage-computation schedule was not such a change 
.. J 
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in ratp. of wages as was intpndert to hI' proseribell by either 
the Stabilization Act or the f'xccntivc orders iSRued thereunder. 
The change in basis of computation was not for the purpose 
of either increasing or decreasing the "total wage" for the 
work which was being performed; it tended directly to keep 
wagl'S stabilized rather than to change them and was made 
for the primary purpose of complying with the Fair Labor 
~tandards Act; as in the Belo case, supra (Walling v. A. H. 
Belo Corp. (1942), 316 U.S. 624, 631 [62 S.Ct. 1223, 1227, 
86 L.Ed. 1716]), the agreement "was to permit as far as pos-
sible the payment of the same total weekly wage ... as before." 
Certainly, if plaintiffs' position were to be upheld, the 
effect would be to increase both the "wage rate" as to 44 
hours of each workweek and the "total wage" for the work 
performed. Such increase was just as much debarred by the 
Stabilization Act and executive orders thereunder as was 
the decrease in wage rate for the first 40 hours, unless the 
Fair Labor Standards Act is to control "unaffected" in its 
"present operation." But if the Fair Labor Standards Act 
does so control, then, as previously shown, the plaintiffs and 
defendant "as a matter of law . . . [were free to] establish 
the 'regular rate' by contract." (Walling v. A. H. Bela 
Corp. (1942), supra, 316 U.S. 624, 631 [62 S.Ct. 1223, 1227, 
86 L.Ed. 1716].) 
In. any event weare satisfied that, under the circumstances 
here disclosed, the agreement, limited as it was in effect and 
fairly and openly reached, was not proscribed by the Stabiliza~ 
tion Act or the executive orders and, being otherwise valid, 
is not reached by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
To recapitulate: It.is apparent from what has been said 
.... ...... _ .. _. __ ._ .. _ ....... that the operation of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not 
by itself require that the total wage be increased; as long as 
the basic or "regular" wage rate was not less than the mini-
mum wage fixed by law (40 cents an . hour at the times here 
concerned) the parties to the wage-employment contract were 
free,insofar as the operation of that act is concerned, to 
l'stablish any basic or "regular" rate they might agree upon 
but were bound to augment that rate for overtime as provided 
by the act. In other words, operation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act merely required that the parties fix (and com-
ply with) a wage-computation schedule as set up by the act. 
I t is further apparent that neither the Wage Stabilization 
Al't of 1942 nor the C:'xecutivp oruf'rs promulgated therelln!lpr 
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8~md.ar(18 Act. Its frpe operation was clll'('£ully prf'IIt"l'Vpd 
the Congrcss and by thc Prl'siuent. Thf' parties to the 
Iit[llIDll'io;ym,ent contract here were bound to comply with it. They 
with it by making the agreement which has been 
That agreement was not for the purpose of, and 
. not result in, either increasing or decreasing in any 
ljpJ~iIl· tiaJ amonnt the total wage paid for the work per-
;ti~elC1' ita object was to comply with the act-an object which 
;wBI5r,a".' only lawful but which the parties were bonnd to 
Since wage stabilization was not substantially 
by the agreement we are satisfied that failure to 
. approval of the National War Labor Board to the 
_lillIftment of the hourly rate schedule did not avoid such 
idt~.ent or otherwise result in increasing the total wage 
~~IlWIS rely upon Employer, (ho'Up, dc. Carrier. v. Na-
. Labor Board (1944), D.C. C.A., 143 F.2d 145, and 
_JIlIl",'lr V. Koenig (1945), 60 F.Supp. 709. In neither of 
were employes seeking to require their employer 
r.a.;Dlel~ to a former basic or "regular" rate of pay on the 
aO'lI'aDceu here, that by reason of the wartime al'ts 
could not be adjusted by agreement in order to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Moreover, in 
those cases does it appear that the court considered 
,-nroV:iJRiOllS of the wartime acts and re!m1ations, quoted 
imi-.Ix),ve, which indicate thi! intention that the Fair Labor 
should be "unaffected" by such acts and regn-
There:!·, 3re, those cases appear to set forth no appli-
~cnples of law controlling here... __ ._,~._ 
re8iSOIlS above stated; the judgment is reversed. 
C_J., Shenk, J., Edmonds; J., Carter, J., and 
concurred. , 
.;uo.<lL,.;".'U" .... J.-I dissent. 
,16, 1944, defendmt paid his employees 92* 
Thereafter he paid 70 cents per hour for the 
hours of any day or 40 hours of any week, $1.05 
for ~ additional hours in the first six consecutive 
$1.40 per hour for any hours on the seventh con-
day. Both before and after the date of the 
:.c:le:[enaaJlt was subject to the provisions of the Fair 
~ta:nd81'ds Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219), which reo 
) 
) 
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quirt''' him tf) p;l~' hi.; I'IlII'I,,)'('('l'{ 0111' :lml '.'III"-h:tlr tillH'S tb,' 
regular Wllgl' rlill' I'or an,Y hOllr<; ,,~,'.""lin~11I tn any wepk. 
It is undispllt~d that d!'fendant was "iolating the ~'air Labor 
Standards Act by failing to pay overtime before July 16th 
and tl1at the subsequent change in the rate of wages was not 
approved by the National War Labor Board. After plaintiffs 
learned that defendant had not secured the approval of the 
W arLabor Board for the reduction in tht' ratt' of wages, they 
brought this action to recover the differenct' between the amount 
they had received and the amount to which they werc entitled 
under the old rate together with liquidated damages and 
attorney's fees at; provided in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Section 5(a) of the Stabilization Act of 1942 provided: 
"No employer shall pay, and no employee shall receive, wages 
or salaries in contravention of the regulations promulgated by 
the President under this Act." (50 U.S.C.A. App. § 965.) 
Executive Order No. 9250, issued pursuant to the authority 
of the act, provided in part: "I. No increases in wage rates 
. . , and no decreases in wage rates, shall be authorized unless 
notice of such increases or decreases shall have been filed 
with the National War Labor Board, and unless the National 
War Labor Board has approved such increases or decreases." 
(50 U.S.C.A. App., p. 315.) Plaintiffs contend that under these 
provisions the revision of the wage rate without the approval 
of the board was ineffective and void, so that the old rate 
remained in full force and effect. 
Dcfenda~t states that this view is contrary to that expressed 
in Pearson Candy Co. v. Wait8,27 Cal.2d 615, 619 [165 P.2d 
674], that "the board's orders ... rest simply on an appeal 
to the moral obligation of the parties and are neither enforce-
able nor reviewabl~ .. [Citations.]" Defendant contends that 
since he would be under no duty to comply if the board ordered 
him to change his rates, his failure to secure approval of a 
change in rates would not render them invalid; This conten-
tion. however, overlooks the dual function of the War Labor 
Board. The Pearson case and other cases enunciating the 
same rule were concerned with directive orders of the board 
issued pursuant to its authority under the War Labor Dis-
putes Act of 1943 (50 U.S.C.A. App_ §§ 1501-1511) to issue 
ordcrs designed to settle labor disputes brought before it. 
This power of the board to issue directive orders in cases of 
labor disputt's was distinct from its power to approve or 
"t' jeet ehanges in wag(> rates under Executive Ordt'r No. 92:;0. 
III exercising the latter power the board did not order allY' 
) 
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". r' thing; it merely approved or failed to approve sugg('sted wage 
'~;rate changes that were tiled with it. It was the statute and 
, the executive order, not a directive of the board, that pro· 
tWIUU<'U wage rate changes if approval was not granted. Any 
~ ~h:A.nll'e in wage rates without such approval was ineffective 
(Wernhardt v. Koenig, 60 F.Supp. 709; Kells v. 
Hntl,frmIB. 184 Misc. 206 [53 N.Y.S.2d 734] ; Claude 8. Ben· 
Inc., v. Bollinger, 72 Ga.App. 531 [34 S.E.2d 563].) 
. 'The majority opinion nevertheless takes the position that 
rate adjustment was designed merely to comply with the 
Labor Standards Act and did not in fact constitute such 
CUiU1/i1[~ in the take-home pay as to require approval of the 
ar Labor Board. This position is untenable. 
take-home pay actually received under the two wage 
'was not substantially the same unless a full 84·hour 
week was worked, and the evidence shows that 
the full week was not worked. Defendant's wit· 
Potts testitied that he and many others did not work 
,. weeks after the rate change; neither did plaintiffs, as is. 
from the records of their time and overtime. The follow-
table illustrates the wages that were actually paid under 
systems for various work weeks. 
I'*, Oft" '10 _t, PIff' hr. ,Iff' hr. with toith 01Jerii1ne 
110 overtl... Gild doubZetitM 
II'IQI'ft1'1bv hours, five days $37.00 $28.00 
lC'OrTV~eUrJlt hours, six days 44.40 36.40 
l8ii,renltv-1:wo hours, six days 66.60 61.60 
'II!i"hf-v.f',,, ... P hours, seven days 77.70 78.40 
the take-home pay; varied with the number of hours 
this case is not similar to Walling v. A. B. Belo Oorp., 
:S. 624 [62 S.Ct. 1223, 86 L.Ed. 1716]. In that case 
emIDl()'VIl!leIlt contract provided for a regular hourly rate 
. paid with time and one-half for overtime and also for 
minimum wage that was to be paid regardless of the 
worked. The relation between the hourly 
-""c _,_ the weekly minimum was such that in practice the 
IlUUU.V'.., .... seldom if ever received other than the weekly mini-
The court there held that the parties could fix the 
hourly rate for the purposes of the Fair Labor Stand-
by contract and rejected the content,lon that for 
the regular rate should be determined by dividing 
minimum by the number of hours actually worked. 
~ .. 9"relnQlmt had a weekly minimum that in fact governed 
) 
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the takc"home pay regardless of what was earned on the basis 
of either the 92% or 70-ccnt hourly rate, there might be some 
merit in the position that the attempted change in the hourI, 
rate did not violate the Stabilization Act. Defendant had 
no such, minimum, however, and the wages actually paid were 
baaed solely on the hourly rates and the time actually worked. 
Furthermore, the working of the 84-hour seven-day week 
was not SUcID an invariable practice that the wages actually 
paid before and after the attempted change in the hourly 
rate remained substantially the same. 
Even if it be assumed that the wages actually paid remained 
the same after the change in the wage rate, the wages to 
which plaintiffs were entitled were sharply reduced by the 
change. Although plaintiffs received only $77.70 for working 
an 84-hour week before the attempted wage rate ~hanget they 
were entitled by virtue of the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
receive $98.05. Under the changed rate they were entitled 
to only $78.40 for the same number of hours. To hold that 
the rate in fact remained the same is to hold that plaintiffs 
had no right to overtime pay under the old rate before the 
adjuatment. This holding would be valid, however, only if the 
Stabilization. Act and Executive Order No. 9250 had the effect 
of fl'tlezing wages at the amounts actually being paid rathel' 
than at the amounts to which employees were entitled by 
virtue of the Fair Labor Standards Act in cases where that 
act was being violated. The Stabilization Act, however, spe-
cifically provided that it was not to have this effect: "No 
action shall be taken under the authority of this Act with 
respect to wages or salaries, (1) which is inconaistent with 
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . ." 
(50 U.S.C.A. App. § 964.) Before the rate adjustment plain-
. tiffs had a right to greater wages than they were receiving. 
That right could have been enforced by an action under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the adjustment, they 
would no longer be entitled to more wages than they actually 
received. It is clear, therefore, that even if the wages paid for 
an 84-hour week remained substantially the same, the result 
of the adjustment was to reduce the wages to which plaintiffs 
were entitled. 
Since defendant's change in his hourly wage rate resulted 
not only in a change in the wages actually paid in many cases, 
but in substantial changes in the wages to which his employees 
were entitled in all cases, the wage change required the 
approval of the War Labor Board. 
